In a two-way deterministic quantum key distribution (DQKD) protocol, Bob randomly prepares qubits in one of four states and sends them to Alice. To encode a bit, Alice performs an operation on each received qubit and returns it to Bob. Bob then measures the backward qubits to learn about Alice's operations and hence the key bits. Recently, we proved the unconditional security of the final key of this protocol in the ideal device setting. In this paper, we prove that two-way DQKD protocols are immune to all detector side channel attacks at Bob's side, while we assume ideal detectors at Alice's side for error testing. Our result represents a step forward in making DQKD protocols secure against general detector side channel attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography, also called quantum key distribution (QKD), allows two remote parties, usually called Alice and Bob, to establish a secret key that can be used to transmit secret message with a classical one-time pad scheme. After the pioneering work presented by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84) , the unconditional security of the BB84 protocol was proven with the assumption of ideal settings [1] [2] [3] [4] . In practice, the devices of QKD are imperfect, the eavesdropper, called Eve, can exploit the imperfections of the devices to gain partial or full information about the key bits [5, 6] . It has been shown that Eve may take advantage of the nonzero multiphoton emission probability of Alice's laser source and the loss of quantum channel, by using the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [7] [8] [9] [10] . Decoy state QKD has been proposed to beat Eve's PNS attacks, which can substantially increase the secure key distribution distance [11] [12] [13] .
An important part of QKD system is the measurement devices. In experiments, the detection efficiency of the practical single-photon detectors (SPDs) is low and in most cases, the two detectors are asymmetric, which may be exploited by the Eve to steal information on the final key. For example, attacks that exploit the efficiency mismatch between two SPDs in QKD system have been proposed, demonstrated, and analyzed; they include the time-shift attack [14] [15] [16] , and the faked states attack [17] . Also, it has been demonstrated experimentally that Eve can tracelessly acquire the full secret key bits using specially tailored bright illumination [18] . Recently, a measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD scheme was proposed to remove detector side channel attacks [19] . The advantage is that security can be guaranteed without regard to the experimental details of the measurement device.
In this scheme, Alice and Bob send signal pulses to a Bell-state measurement device which may be owned by Eve and it is proven that they can distill some secure key bits based on the Bell measurement results.
Recently, the security of four-state deterministic quantum key distribution (DQKD) with a two-way quantum channel against the most general attacks has been proven by us [20, 21] under the ideal-device setting, while it is widely believed that two-way DQKD is vulnerable under Eve's practical attacks because Eve can attack the travel photon in both forward and backward lines. In this paper, we prove that two variations of the DQKD protocol are immune to all detector side channel attacks at Bob's side in the backward line. We do not analyze the MDI security of Alice's detectors and assume that they are ideal and non-blinded.
II. SECURITY OF THE FOUR-STATE PROTOCOL
In most QKD protocols, after distributing all signal qubits, Alice and Bob should communicate through public channel for basis reconciliation. In the BB84 protocol, about half of Bob's measurement results are discarded due to the inconsistent bases Alice and Bob used 1 . But, in two-way DQKD protocols [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] , Bob can decode Alice's key bits after measuring the returned qubits directly, without basis reconciliation. This means that all measurement results will be used for key distillation 2 . The two-way DQKD was first proposed by using entanglement [23] . Later, single-photon two-state protocol [26] was proposed for improving the experimental performance and then single-photon four-state protocol was proposed independently in Refs. [27, 28] . After that, the security of two-way DQKD against some special attacks were studied [24, 29] . Recently, the security of the four-state protocol against the most general attacks under the ideal-device setting was proved by us [20, 21] . In the asymptotic scenario, after verifying ξ ≡ (
Bob can get the secure final key against general attacks with the generation rate,
where h(x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x) is the binary entropy function, and h(ξ) and h(e)
are the amounts of key bits Alice and Bob should sacrifice for EC and PA.
With the idea of delaying PA, the security of a two-way DQKD protocol that uses four states and four encoding operations was proven [21] [see Fig. 1(b) ]. It has been shown that the idea of delaying PA can simplify the security proof of two-way DQKD protocols, with the same key generation rate as that derived in [20] . The security of two-way DQKD can also be proved against most general attacks with the entropic uncertainty relation, and a higher final key generation rate may be achieved [30] .
III. SECURITY OF THE FOUR-STATE PROTOCOL AGAINST ALL DETEC-TOR SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS IN LINE A-TO-B
We prove in this section the MDI security of line A-to-B for the original four-state protocol with two encoding operations proposed by Refs. [27, 28] , and the four-state protocol with four encoding operations proposed by Ref. [21] . Our proof relies on the use of equivalent protocols. Eve makes a measurement on Alice's qubit using Bob's basis, and returns the measurement result to Bob.
Note that Bob tells Eve the basis only after the Alice has received the qubit on line B-to-
A. This ensures that Eve cannot determine the initial qubit Bob sent out. Intuitively, we can
FIG. 1. We prove that the four-state DQKD protocols with two encoding operations (a) and four encoding operations (b) are MDI secure in line A-to-B. Protocol (b) was shown to be equivalent to protocol (c) where the forward channel runs the BB84 protocol and the backward channel runs a classical one-time pad (OTP) [21] . Here, a, a 1 , and a 2 represent a raw secret key bit in all three protocols randomly chosen by Alice. In protocol (b), either a 1 or a 2 will be used as the key bit depending on the basis chosen by Bob which he will inform Alice after his measurement. Here, |b w represents eigenstate b of basis w and M w represents a measurement in basis w.
understand the security of the modified protocol as follows. Since Bob randomly prepares the signal qubit in one of the four states, Eve cannot know Alice's encoding operations even if she gets Bob's measurement result. To know Alice's encoding, Eve has to know Bob's initial state as well.
To prove security of the modified protocol rigorously, we consider the PA term in the key rate formula. The secure key rate r P A from PA for secret key generation is given by Renner and König's result [31] : |− −|, respectively. Since ρ B|z = ρ B|x = I/2, further evolution of this state will be independent of the basis. Thus,
For completeness, we describe ρ ABE in more detailed as follows. Eve's most general attack on B-to-A channel can be described as a joint unitary operation together with ancilla.
After Eve's attack on B-to-A channel, the joint state of the forward qubit and Eve's ancilla
where |E is the initial state of Eve's ancilla. After
Alice's encoding operations, the joint state of backward qubit and Eve's ancilla becomes
(2) reduces r P A to r P A = S(ρ ABE ) − S(ρ BE ) for the modified protocol;
and also ρ ABE in the modified protocol is the same as in the original protocol because ρ B undergoes the same evolution in both protocols. Therefore, we can directly apply the calculation of r P A of the original protocol and its result to the modified protocol here. In summary, the modified protocol has the same key rate formula Eq. (1). The four-state protocol is secure independent of the measurement and is immune against all detector side channel attacks in line A-to-B. 
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Although the two-way DQKD has higher resistance to PNS attack-like attacks [32] , decoy states are necessary to modify the four-state protocol for long-distance key distribution [33] .
Another problem is that the two-way QKD is vulnerable to Eve's Trojan horse attacks, such as the invisible photon attack [29] . In practice, Alice can add a filter to defeat Eve's invisible photon attack. All Bob's photon pulses should pass through Alice's filter first and only wavelengths close to the operating wavelength are allowed to pass through.
It has been widely believed that, since Eve can attack the travel photons both in line B-to-A and in line A-to-B, QKD with a two-way quantum channel is more vulnerable under Eve's practical attacks comparing with one-way QKD protocol, such as the BB84 protocol.
In this paper, we have shown that two four-state protocols are MDI secure in line A-to-B, i.e., 
